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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates whether government procurement
costs are minimized through auction competition. In other words, we ex-
amine the e￿ects of the competitive environment (number of participants)
on the cost of procurement, which is often de￿ned as the competition ef-
fect. We use a unique data set provided by Public Procurement Authority
(PPA) of Turkey that covers all government procurement auctions for
the years 2004-2006. This paper has two major results. First, various re-
gression speci￿cations show that the number of bidders signi￿cantly and
negatively a￿ects the procurement price. Thus, existence of a competitive
environment signi￿cantly decreases procurement costs in Turkey. Second,
when auctions are open to foreign participation, the auction price is lower.
This is caused by an increase in the competitiveness of the auctions; anal-
ysis shows that number of bidders is signi￿cantly higher when auctions
are open to foreign participation. The results of this paper has several
policy implications for e-procurement and e￿cient procurement design.
1 Introduction
Government procurement auctions have been analyzed in many theoretical and
empirical studies in the economics literature. The main reason for this much
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1attention is that government procurement comprises a substantial part of the
GDP, which signi￿es the importance of e￿cient procurement auctions for the
macroeconomic dynamics of a country.
In 2007, the value of procured goods and services and construction projects
reached at YTL61 billion4 (approximately US$51 billion,) which corresponds to
slightly more than 7 percent of the Turkish GDP. 5 These ￿gures portray not only
the importance of government procurement auctions in the economy but also the
importance of improvements for cost savings in government procurement auc-
tions. This paper empirically investigates how government procurement costs
are a￿ected by auction competition. In other words, we examine the e￿ects of
the competitive environment (number of participants) on the cost of procure-
ment (winning bid), which is often de￿ned as the competition e￿ect. We use a
unique data set provided by the Public Procurement Authority (PPA) of Turkey
which covers all government procurement auctions for the years 2004-2006.
Despite the signi￿cance of the government procurement auctions, empiri-
cal studies of procurement auctions are limited in the literature, especially for
developing economies. The main reason is the nonexistent or very limited ac-
cess to comprehensive procurement auctions data. Fortunately, Turkish Public
Procurement Law no: 4734 and 4735 call for collection of detailed information
about all government procurement auctions held in Turkey to be complied by
the PPA. Accordingly, the PPA possesses a very valuable and extensive dataset
which can be utilized to investigate government procurement auctions in detail.
Consequently, this study is one of the ￿rst to use such a comprehensive dataset
in analyzing the competitive environment in Turkish procurement auctions.
Although auctions are investigated extensively in the literature, there are
fewer studies on the e￿ects of increasing the number of participants on the
results of procurement auctions (competition e￿ect.) 6 Gupta (2002), analyzes
how many bidders are required for auctions to be competitive. By empirically
analyzing highway construction auctions he shows that the winning bid amount
signi￿cantly decreases as the number of bidders rises to the level of about six
to eight ￿rms. Paarsch (1992) also argues that in the common value paradigm
(CVP) the competition e￿ect would taper o￿ when the number of bidders is
large, because of the expected winner’s curse e￿ect. In the independent private
value paradigm (IPVP), on the other hand, the equilibrium bid function may be
monotonic. Using data on tree planting contract auctions, he tests and rejects
the hypothesis that the bid function decreases monotonically with the number
of bidders, as expected at standard ￿rst-price sealed-bid auctions within the
private value model.
A theoretical study by Elberfeld and Wolfstetter (1999) shows that in a
dynamic model of Bertrand competition with entry, increasing the number of
competitors above two makes the competitive outcome less likely. They also ar-
gue that their model can be applied to auctions and that a revenue maximizing
4This ￿gure does not include ￿nancial sector and defense procurement auctions.
5Nominal GDP of Turkey in 2007 was YTL856 billion.
6Studies like Asker and Cantillon (2008) considers the e￿ect of quality of the product on
auction design besides price.
2auctioneer should restrict the number of bidders if bidder participation is costly.
Similarly, Fan and Wolfstetter (2008) build on the previous study by modeling
a simple procurement auction game in which the contractors have two costs;
cost of performing the contract, and the cost of preparing a bid. In their game
theoretic model they show that the equilibrium price increases in the number
of bidders. Thus, they argue, a pro￿t maximizing procurer should restrict the
number of bidders to two. However, Brannman et al (1987) test whether win-
ning bid decreases with number of bidders using data on tax exempt bonds,
o￿shore oil tracts, and National Forest timber auctions. Parallel to the the-
oretical predictions they show that winning bids signi￿cantly decreases with
more bidders. In a paper that is closest to our study, Iimi (2006) investigates
the competition e￿ect in the Japanese O￿cial Development Assistance (ODA)
projects. He studies 208 procurement auctions for large-scale ODA projects in
23 developing countries for the period from April 1999 to March 2005. Iimi
reports that winning bid decreases as the number of bidders increases. Thus,
increasing local ￿rm participation in auctions strengthens bidding competition
and results in more e￿ciency at the auction level.
In this study, using the methodology implemented in Rezende (2005) and
Iimi (2006), we investigate the e￿ect of number of bidders on the costs of gov-
ernment procurement auctions. This study makes the following contributions
to the literature. First, using a unique dataset, we provide empirical evidence
about the e￿ects of competitive environment on the e￿ciency of government
procurement auctions. Second, because of data limitations, there are no stud-
ies that examines all government procurement auctions in a country; hence,
to the best of our knowledge, this study is the ￿rst one that investigates all
government procurement auctions in an economy. Third, the unique structure
of the PPA dataset allows us to investigate the e￿ects of sectoral, institutional
and auction method di￿erences and the e￿ect of the auctions being open to
participation of foreigners.
We analyze 130,094 government procurement auctions for the years 2004
to 2006. We have two major results. First, di￿erent regression speci￿cations
show that the number of bidders signi￿cantly and negatively a￿ects the procure-
ment price. Thus, competitive environment signi￿cantly improves e￿ciency of
government procurement auctions in Turkey. This ￿nding is in line with the
￿ndings of Iimi (2006) but contrary to Fan and Wolfstetter (2008). Second,
when auctions are open to foreign participation, the auction price is lower. This
is caused by increased competitive environment. Analysis shows that number
of bidders is signi￿cantly higher when auctions are open to foreigners.
Besides providing valuable empirical results for designing e￿cient procure-
ment auctions in the conventional ways, the analysis of this paper has implica-
tions for the use of electronic tools and systems known as electronic procurement
(e-procurement) applications. Since e-procurement decreases costs of auction
information dissemination and also potentially participation costs, we expect
higher participation rates. The results of this paper provides evidence that
competitive environment signi￿cantly lowers prices in government procurement
auctions. The O￿ce of Government Commerce of UK (OGC) in its 2005 report
3indicates that the countries that implement e-procurement systems get savings
averaging over 13%.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces theoretical
and empirical models presenting the importance of focusing on the number of
bidders while studying procurement auctions. Section 3 presents an overview
of government procurement auctions in Turkey and the PPA. Section 4 shows
the unique properties of the PPA dataset. Section 5 describes the data and the
methodology used to conduct the analysis. Section 6 estimates the competition
e￿ect and presents the results. Section 7 argues the policy implications of the
results and section 8 concludes.
2 Why study e￿ect of N? (Theoretical and Em-
pirical Models)
Procurement auctions o￿ered by PPA of Turkey can be modelled as ￿rst-price
sealed-bid auctions with independent private values. 8 The cost of the contract to
a bidder depends only on its own type, but the ￿rm’s bidding behavior depends
on its expectation about other ￿rms’ costs and how they bid. We can barrow
from the auction literature9 and show the existence of a symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in this environment. A single contract is to be awarded to
one of the n ￿rms. Each ￿rm i, i = 1;:::;n, recevies a type ci and its cost is
equal to the type it receives. The implicit assumption here is that the ￿rms are
risk-neutral.
Each ￿rm knows its own cost ci and that its opponents’ valuations are drawn
independently from the distribution F(:) with density f(:) > 0 in the interval
[c;c]. Suppose that a ￿rm has a cost of c = ci and believes that other players
follow a bidding strategy b(:). Knowing only its cost and the distribution of
the costs of other players, the ￿rm has to ￿gure out its best reply. The payo￿
function of bidder i submitting a price bid, b(ci), is given by:
(bi) = (ci;bi;b(:)) =
(
bi   ci if bi < minfb(cj)g
0 if bi  minfb(cj)g
(1)
where j = 1;:::;i   1;i + 1;:::;n.
7O￿ce of Government Commerce (OGC) (2005), ￿e-Procurement in Action - A guide to
e-Procurement in the Public Sector,￿ http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/cp0025.pdf, page 6.
8As costs of goods and services procured by the government in the auctions depend on
technology and other factors of productions that di￿er from bidder to bidder, valuations of
each bidder may di￿er from each other. Hence, independent private values auction model
is appropriate. For example, Iimi (2006) uses independent private values model to analyze
procurement auctions for Japanese o￿cial development assistance projects, Iimi (2007) does
the same in analyzing procurement auctions for Asian Development Bank-assisted highway
projects in China.
9See Krishna (2002), Wolsfetter (1996) and Menezes and Monteiro (2008)
4It is shown in the literature10 that a symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy
for all ￿rms is:
b(c) = c +
  c
c [1   F (x)]
n 1 dx
[1   F (c)]
n 1 (2)
The amount of shading, in the procurement auctions ￿additional amount on







dx. It decreases with the number of bidders.
That is, submitted bids get closer to true costs as number of competing ￿rms
gets larger in a procurement auction. This theoretical result motivates the
empirical study of e￿ects of number of bidders on procurement price.
3 Overview of Government Procurement Auctions
in Turkey and the PPA
To achieve e￿ciency and regulate government procurement auctions the PPA is
established by the Turkish Procurement Laws no: 4734 and 4735 in 2002. Law
no:4734 indicates that
The purpose of this law is to establish the principles and procedures
to be applied in procurements held by all public entities and in-
stitutions governed by public law or under public control or using
public funds. ::: In tenders to be conducted in accordance with this
Law, the contracting entities are liable for ensuring transparency,
competition, equal treatment, reliability, con￿dentiality, public su-
pervision, and procurement of needs are being carried out under
appropriate conditions and in a timely manner, and for the e￿cient
use of resources. ::: A record of procurement proceedings shall be
kept for all procurements. This record of procurement proceedings
shall include the certi￿cate of approval and its attached priced bill
of quantities relating to the estimated cost obtained from the con-
tracting o￿cer, the tender documents, the advertisement texts, the
tenders or the applications and other documents submitted by can-
didates or tenderers, and all documents relating to the procurement
process such as minutes and decisions of the tender commission.
Article 53 of the Law no: 4734 presents the establishment and main responsi-
bilities of the PPA as the following:
In order to carry out the duties assigned with this Law, a Public
Procurement Authority with public legal entity, which is adminis-
tratively and ￿nancially autonomous, has been established. Public
Procurement Authority is assigned and authorized for the accurate
10See 9. Wolsfetter () equation 41 is for Dutch Auction. By modifying it for procurement
auctions, we get equation
5implementation of the principles, procedures and proceedings spec-
i￿ed in this Law. ::: The duties and authorities of the Public Pro-
curement Authority with respect to the tender procedures carried
out in accordance with this Law are as follows: ::: to gather in-
formation relating to the contracts and tender proceedings carried
out as speci￿ed by the Authority, to compile and publish statistics
relating to quantity, price and other issues.
As mentioned above, the PPA is established in 2002 to govern government
procurement auctions. The PPA is the only authority to implement the pro-
curement procedures and regulations and gather information about government
procurement auctions. The PPA is responsible for all sectors except ￿nancial
sector and military procurement. Table I and Table II present summary statis-
tics for the government procurement auctions for 2004-2006 registered to the
PPA of Turkey. 11
(Table I and II about here.)
4 Data and Methodology
4.1 A Unique Dataset
The government procurement dataset of the PPA has two distinctive properties.
First, the dataset contains detailed records of all completed government pro-
curement auctions apart from ￿nancial sector and defense procurements. This
unique feature of the dataset allows us to investigate auction e￿ciency and com-
petitiveness for the whole economy by taking into account sectoral, institutional
and auction type di￿erences. Second, collecting and recording data about all
the government procurement auctions are among the major responsibilities of
the PPA by the Turkish Procurement Laws no: 4734 and 4735 that require
the public authorities carriying out procurements to report the auction spec-
i￿cations listed by the law to the PPA through an online system. The PPA
allocates signi￿cant resources to data gathering and recording. Thus, the PPA
dataset is a reliable and detailed source to analyze procurement auctions in a
number of ways.
4.2 Detailed Description of the Data
The PPA data set used in this study spans the years from 2004 to 2006 12. The
variables in the dataset are as the following:
1. Winning bid (lowest bid): The PPA dataset contains the winning bids for
each of the public procurement auctions run during the 2004-2006 period.
11Summary statistics are from the 2004 - 2006 PPA Annual Reports are available through
http://www.ihale.gov.tr/Istatistikler_Raporlar/faaliyet_raporlari.htm
12The data period is limited by the availability of detailed data from the PPA.
6The PPA law requires collection of only the value of the winning bid and
number of bidders. Thus, we do not have data about bids other than the
winning bid. Rezende (2007) shows that the value function of the bidders
can be correctly represented by the winning bid and number of bidders.
Iimi (2006) conducts his study using all bids and using only the winning
bid with similar results.13
2. Estimated cost: Before the auction announcements are made, experts
estimate the cost of the product to be procured. The accuracy of these
estimates are controlled by the PPA as the PPA uses these estimates to
investigate whether the auctions are conducted according to the law and
speci￿ed rules.
3. Number of bidders (N): The number of legitimate bids that are submitted
and recorded by the PPA. Since, a bidder submits one bid in a procurement
auction, the number of bids is equal to the number of bidders for a given
auction.
4. Dummy for the participation of non-Turkish bidders (OPENFOREIGN):
This dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the auction is open to foreign
participants. 33,646 auctions are open to the foreign participants during
the 2004-6 period.
5. Dummies for public institutions that make the procurement (INST): There
are 28 di￿erent institutions that conduct procurement auctions from mu-
nicipalities to health and education ministries. We control for institutional
di￿erences using institution dummies. The institutions are displayed in
the Appendix table A.1.
6. Dummies for sectors of the procurement (SECTOR): 78 di￿erent sectors
are de￿ned in the PPA dataset. We control for the properties of di￿erent
goods and services by using sector dummies. The sectors and the number
of bidders in each sector are presented in the Appendix ￿gure A.2.
7. Dummies for the auction types (AUCTYPE): Auctions are seperated into
5 di￿erent categories with respect to type of procurement. These cate-
gories are: Consulting, construction, service, goods, other.
8. Dummies for auction method (AUCMETHOD): There are 26 di￿erent
auction methods de￿ned in the Procurement Law of Turkey. First price
sealed bid auctions has the largest number of observations; 99,188. The
other auction types are ￿rst price auctions but can be subject to some re-
strictions de￿ned in the procurement law of Turkey as explained in articles
18-23 of the Government Procurement Law: no 4734.
13One can think of the changes in prices of the procured items due to in￿ation. As explained
in Section 4.3, we are using the log di￿erence of the winning bid and the estimated cost. Since
both the winning bid and the estimation price are in that year’s prices, the log di￿erence
becomes unit free; hence the in￿ation e￿ect is eliminated.
7The dependent variable of the regression is the natural logarithm of the ratio of
winning bids to the estimated costs. Since the data set include all types of goods
and services procured, this dependent variable provides a common measure that
allows us to investigate all types of goods and services in regressions. De Silva
et. al. (2005) de￿ne this ratio as ￿relative bid￿. Table III indicates that the
standard deviation of winning bids is very high. By using the ratio of winning
bids to the estimated costs, we construct an index which makes the results of
the regression analyses easier to interpret.
The main focus is on the variable N, the number of bidders. OPENFOR-
EIGN, INST, SECTOR, AUCTYPE and AUCMETHOD are used as control
variables. However, OPENFOREIGN has the potential to provide interesting
results since it might have signi￿cant impact on the competitive environment of
procurements.
(Table III about here.)
Table III provides the summary statistics of the variables used in the analy-
sis.14 The original PPA dataset contains data for 222,800 auctions. In table III,
there are 286 procurement auctions where the winning bid value is zero. All of
these 286 auctions are conducted by the Ministry of Health. These zero winning
bid auctions can be the result of high competition between drug companies which
might be considering future revenues once the drug agreements are done. 15 N is
equal to zero for 343 observations, i.e. 0.14% of all the observations. N is equal
to one for 89,908 observations, i.e. 40.35% of all the observations. 16 Note that
auctions with no bidders or a single bidder are dropped from the dataset. The
focus of this study is to analyze the competition e￿ect in government procure-
ment auctions and having no or just one participant (bid) means competitive
environment does not exist. Moreover, including auctions with only one par-
ticipant would bias our results because of the absence of competition. 17After
14Table III shows that the minimum of the estimated cost is zero. There are 13 auctions
that has zero estimated cost among 130,094 auctions. Most likely this has occurred because
the institution that runs the auction could not ￿nd an expert in the ￿eld to perform this
estimation. While calculating the index that we use as the dependent variable, log di￿erence
of the winning bid and estimated cost, the auctions with 0 estimated costs are dropped.
15There are 286 among 130094 auctions (0.2% of auctions with 2 or more bids) procurement
with winning bid amount zero. These observations have a mean estimated cost of YTL570,411.
The summary statistics of the estimated cost of the auctions with zero winning bid value.
Observation Mean Standar Dev Min Max
286 570411 1028373 0 4695920
200 (82%) of these auctions are in sector 330000 and 20 (8%) of these auctions are in sector
100.
16The summary statistics of the winning bid value of the auctions with one bid. The values
are in YTL:
Observation Mean Standar Dev Min Max
89908 260301.3 6563522 0 9.46e+08
43% of these auctions are done for purchase of services, 52% for goods procurement and 5%
are for construction.
17If we were to include auctions with a single participant, the magnitude of our results
would be biased and we would be capturing the e￿ect of increasing the number of participants
8dropping 0 and 1 bid auctions and the outliers 18, the dataset used in this study
includes data for 130,094 government procurement auctions. Figure I shows the
distribution of the number of bidders across auctions. We see that more than 25
percent of the auctions have only 2 bidders. Furthermore, more than 60 percent
of the auctions have less than 7 bidders.
(Figure I about here.)
4.3 Methodology:
As the focus is on the competitiveness in procurement auctions, we drop the
procurement auctions with no and one bidder from the PPA dataset. We also
identify the outliers using the Grubbs methodology 19 and conducted our anal-
ysis without the outliers. The Grubbs methodology identi￿es auctions with
39 bidders and more as outliers. The outliers are described in detail in the
Appendix tables A.2 and A.3.20
As in Iimi (2006), we implement conventional functional forms and also a









wbit= winning bid of auction i at time t21
ecostit = estimated cost of auction i at time t.
Log di￿erence of the winning bid and the estimated cost of the auction,
ln( wbit
ecostit), is used as the dependent variable. De Silva et. al. (2005) and De
Silva et. al. (2007) use the relative bids as the dependent variable. In their
paper, the relative bid is de￿ned as ￿the bid divided by the engineering cost
estimate.￿ There are various types of goods and services that are procured by
the government. By using ln( wbit
ecostit) as the dependent variable and using control
variables the e￿ects of such di￿erences on regression analyses are eliminated.
Also, usage of ln( wbit
ecostit) eliminates the e￿ects of in￿ation on the winning bid
from one to many. Even though this is an important issue for procurement auctions, we are
not interested in it in this study. Here, we assume the existence of at least some amount of
competition (two participants,) and then analyze the e￿ect of additional participants on the
auction price.
18We consider auctions with more than 38 bidders as outliers. The methodology we have
utilized to identify the outliers is discussed in the next section.
19Grubbs’ test (Grubbs (1969) and Stefansky (1972)) is used to detect outliers in a univariate
data set. Grubbs’ test detects one outlier at a time. This outlier is expunged from the dataset
and the test is iterated until no outliers are detected. The Grubbs test is also known as the
maximum normed residual test.
20There are 2485 auctions in the data set that are identi￿ed as outliers with 39 number of
bidders or more. The mean value of the winning bids for these observations is YTL46,835.
21Each auction has a unique auction number assigned by the PPA. Thus the time dimension
is not needed to identify the auction.
9since both the winning bid and estimated costs are calculated for the same
point in time. Thus, by using the log di￿erence of the winning bid and the
estimated cost as the dependent variable, we construct a robust index that can
be used in our analysis. A higher ln( wbit
ecostit) means that the contract price of the
procured auction is higher than the estimated cost. A lower index, ln( wbit
ecostit)
value indicates that the auction is more e￿cient. In other words the auction
achieves a price that is closer to the cost of the procured goods or services.
g(Nit)in eq(3) contains the competition e￿ect. Di￿erent speci￿cations of
g(Nit)captures di￿erent nonlinear functions of N. We investigate linear, quadratic,
logarithmic and ￿exible nonlinear speci￿cations as in Rezende (2005). Tables
V, VI, VII, and VIII present the regression results for di￿erent g(Nit) speci￿ca-
tions. Table VIII implements the nonlinear speci￿cation proposed by Rezende
(2005). He indicates that the structural estimation of the value function of the
bidders can be done by an adaptation of ordinary least squares. The regression
includes dummies of each number of bidders (N). The results of estimation of
the equation 3 are given in Table VIII. 22
The inclusion of OpenForeignit dummy variable in the regressions reveals
the e￿ects of procurement auctions being open to foreign participation. We
expect it to decrease the auction price since access by foreign participants means
larger number of bidders in the auction. The results regarding the e￿ects of
OpenForeignit are given in Tables IX and X.
5 Estimation Results
Using several regression speci￿cations we investigated the e￿ect of competitive
environment on the procurement price of the auctions. Table IV presents the
summary of results of di￿erent regression speci￿cations. In all the regression
speci￿cations the number of bidders is signi￿cant and the coe￿cient of N is neg-
ative. This result, as expected, indicates that as number of bidders increases the
winning bid decreases. In other words, the competitive environment promotes
lower equilibrium bids. In addition, OPENFOREIGN is signi￿cant with a neg-
ative coe￿cient indicating that when auctions are open to foreign participation,
the winning bid is lower. This result is very intuitive since when the auction
is open to foreign participation it is expected to be more competitive. Table X
shows that the number of bidders (N) is signi￿cantly higher when the auction
is open to foreigners. On average the number of bidders increase almost by 4
when the auction is open to foreign participation.
(Table IV about here.)
Table V presents the linear equilibrium winning bid function. Regression
results with and without control variables indicate that number of bidders has
signi￿cant negative e￿ect on the procurement price.
22This estimation follows the second methodology of Rezende (2005).
10(Table V about here.)
Table VI displays the quadratic nonlinear regression. N2 is added to the
regression as an explanatory variable. Quadratic regression has similar results
as well. In all of the regression speci￿cations the number of bidders has a
negative coe￿cient and it is signi￿cant. OPENFOREIGN is signi￿cant with a
negative coe￿cient for the second speci￿cation.
(Table VI about here.)
Table VII shows the results of the logarithmic regression. In all of the
regression speci￿cations the number of bidders is signi￿cant and the coe￿cient
of N is negative. OPENFOREIGN is signi￿cant with a negative coe￿cient for
the second speci￿cation.
(Table VII about here.)
Table VIII shows the results of the ￿exible nonlinear regression as proposed
by Rezende (2005). In all of the regression speci￿cations the number of bidders
is signi￿cant and the coe￿cient of N is negative. OPENFOREIGN is signi￿cant
with a negative coe￿cient for the second speci￿cation. In this speci￿cation
N=2 dummy variable in not included in the regression. Thus, the coe￿cients of
N dummy variables measures the e￿ect of number of bidders compared to the
lowest number of bidders. N=2. All of the coe￿cients of the dummy variables
are negative and signi￿cant. This result indicates that when the number of
bidders increase from 2 to the speci￿ed number the procurement price decreases.
Thus, competitive environment lowers procurement price.
(Table VIII about here.)
Figure II displays the coe￿cients of N dummies of the nonlinear regression
speci￿cation of Table VIII. The coe￿cient of the N dummies decreases as N
increases until N is equal to 19. Thus, the e￿ect of the competitive environment
gets larger as number of bidders increases. After N = 19 an additional bidder
does not lower the procurement price that much. As a result, ￿gure II shows
that each additional bidder lowers procurement price but the e￿ect is much
higher until the number of bidders is 19.
(Figure II about here.)
Finally, the e￿ect of competitive environment (number of bidders) is in-
vestigated with di￿erent regression speci￿cations with di￿erent sets of control
variables. All of the regression speci￿cations indicate that number of bidders
lowers the equilibrium winning bid. In all of the regressions, N is signi￿cant
with negative coe￿cient.
The other important result of the regression analyses is the e￿ect of OPEN-
FOREIGN on the auction results. When an auction is open to foreign participa-
tion, the equilibrium bid is lower. The regression results in table IX show that
11the winning bid is signi￿cantly lower for the auctions which are open to foreign
participation. The results in Table X explain the intuition behind the e￿ects
of OPENFOREIGN. Table X presents that the number of bidders (N) is sig-
ni￿cantly higher when the auction is open to foreign participation. On average
the number of bidders increase by almost 4 when the auction is open to foreign
participation. As a result, when procurement auctions are open to the bid-
ding of foreigners the procurement price is lower because of a more competitive
environment in other words an increase in number of bidders.
(Table IX about here.)
(Table X about here.)
6 Policy Implications
The results of the empirical investigation of all Turkish government procurement
auctions deliver important policy implications. First of all, the importance of
the competitive environment shown empirically by this study for government
procurement auctions can be translated as increasing the number of bidders in
order to decrease costs of procured items. Policies to increase the number of
bidders provide an auction environment in which governments can have huge
savings due to the decreases in the winning bids. Second, the results indicate
that when the auction is open to foreign participation, even more decreases,
more savings for governments are achieved compared to auctions that are open
to domestic ￿rms only. Hence, as foreign participation to the government pro-
curement auctions contributes to the competitive environment and signi￿cantly
lowers winning bids, governments should consider opening auctions to foreign
participation where possible and steps should be taken to attract participation
of not only national but foreign ￿rms as well.
As the results show, an increase in participation decreases the winning bid in
a procurement auction. Electronic procurement (e-procurement) is another tool
that can be used to increase participation. In e-procurement, announcements
can be made on a website and bids can be accepted in electronic environment.
This increases the information di￿usion and hence auction participation. As
participation potentially increases, there are potential savings in procurement
costs. Therefore, adaptation of e-procurement systems should be a priority.
The e-commerce experience of the UK is a good example for the savings
achieved through increase in number of bidders by adopting e-commerce. The
O￿ce of Government Commerce of UK (OGC) in its 2005 report indicates that
the countries that implement e-procurement systems get savings averaging over
13%. Also, South Korea successfully implements government e-procurement
through its KONEPS : Korea ON-line E-Procurement System. It is indicated
in the KONEPS website 23 that KONEPS has become the world’s largest cyber
market reaching an annual trade volume of USD 43 bn by 2005. In 2005,
23http://www.korea.go.kr/eng/Webzine/webzine.jsp?vol=200602&paper=agencies_01&no=1165225946218
12through e-Procurement works, transaction costs worth USD 4.5 bn have been
saved yearly.
7 Conclusion
We use a unique dataset of Turkish government procurement auctions to investi-
gate the e￿ectiveness of procurement auctions. We implement several regression
speci￿cations to analyze e￿ects of competition on procurement costs by using
the data set comprising all the government procurement auctions done in Turkey
during the years 2004-2006. There are two main results of this study. First, the
contract price (lowest bid) signi￿cantly declines as the number of ￿rms partici-
pating in the procurement auction becomes larger. Several di￿erent regression
speci￿cation render the same result. Thus, the results of this study are robust.
Second, when the auction is open to foreign participation the auction becomes
more competitive and the contract price is signi￿cantly lower. As explained in
the previous section, these results have many policy implications.
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Summary Statistics of Government procurement in 2006 
(The statistics include First Price Open Auctions, Restricted Participation Auctions and 
Negotitions) 
 
  Amount  Percent  Value (New Turkish Liras)  Percent 
Goods Procurement  72719  53  9352059318  32 
Service Procurement  46733  34  8773001898  30 
Construction  18.405  13  11183943251  38 




Procurement Auctions by Auction Method in 2006 
 
  Amount  Percent  Value (New Turkish Liras)  Percent 
Auction Method         
First Price Open Auction  120007  87.1  26616826696  91 
Restricted Participation  572  0.4  350648839  1 
Negotiation  17.278  12.5  2341528932  8 
Total  137857  100  29309004467  100  
Table III 
 
Summary Statistics of the Variables (Outliers Excluded) 
 










130094  6150234  1,260,000,000  0  385,000,000,000 











130094  6.7  6.3  2  38 
OPENFOREIGN  129,677 auctions have data about participation of foreigners. 33,646 of those are open to 
bids by foreigners. The institutions are displayed in the Appendix. 
INST  There are 28 different institutions that make the procurement auction. 
SECTOR  There are 78 different sectors that the procurement belongs to 
AUCTYPE  There 5 different auction types. (Consulting, construction, service, good, other) 
AUCMETHOD  There are 24 different auction methods defined in the procurement law of Turkey. First 
price auction has the largest amount of observations. (99,188) 
 
  
                                                
1 Dependent Variable = log( lowest bid)-log( estimated cost) 
2 lowest bid =0 and estimated cost = 0 are dropped. 
3 1.87 percent of the observations (2485 observations) are identified as outliers by the Grubbs’ methodology. 
Number of bidders larger than 38 are  identified as outliers and dropped. 
 Table IV 
Summary of the Regression Results 
 
 
  Results of Table V 
 
 
Results of Table VI 
 
 
Results of Table VII  Result of Table VIII 












RM8  RM9  RM10 
Sign of the N 
coefficient  Negative  Negative  Negative  Negative  Negative  Negative  Negative  Negative  Negative  Negative 
Significance of N  Significant  Significant  Significant  Significant  Significant  Significant  Significant  Significant  Significant  Significant 
Sign of the 
coefficient of 
OPENFOREIGN    Negative  Negative    Negative  Negative    Negative  Negative  Negative 
Significance of 
OPENFOREIGN    Significant  Not Significant    Significant 
Not 






Y N Control β β β +
=
= + +∑  
The table displays the regression results of the linear equation where the dependent variable (Y) is log(Lowest 
Bid – log(Estimated Cost) and independent variables are number of bidders (N) and control variables. These 
regressions use the data set without outliers (N>38). Outliers of N identified using Grubbs’ test for outliers. 
Number of bidders equal to and larger than 38 are identified as outliers. 
The control variables are : 
OPENFOREIGN = Dummy variable that has the value of 1 if the auction is open to bids by foreigners.  
INST  =  27  different  dummy  variables  for  the  government  institution  that  is  responsible  for  the  auction. 
(Institution dummy for ozel idare is dropped (idaredum1)) 
SECTOR = 77 different dummy variables for different sector specifications for the procucts that is auctiones. 
AUCTYPE = 4 different dummy variables  for construction, service, good and other (consulting is dropped.) 
AUCMETHOD =  25 different dummy variables for auction methods defined in the procurement law of Turkey 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
N  -0.108 
(161.18)**   
-0.103 
(148.51)**   
-0.071 
(82.39)** 
OPENFOREIGN    -0.280 
(28.17)**   
-0.014 
(1.22) 
INST      10 out of 27 
coefficients are 
significant (all at 
1%) Most of the 
coefficients are 
negative. 
SECTOR      32 out of 77 are 
significant. Most 
of the coefficients 
are positive. 
AUCTYPE      All 4 coefficients 
are not 
significant. 
AUCMETHOD      5 out of 25 are 
significant. 
Constant  -0.272 
(44.26)**   
-0.233 
(37.12)**   
-0.078 
(0.31) 









* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
Robust standar errors are estimated with similar results. 








Y N N N Control β β β β +
=
= + + +∑  
The  table  displays  the  regression  results  of  the  nonlinear  equation  where  the  dependent  variable  (Y)  is 
log(Lowest  Bid  – log(Estimated  Cost)  and independent  variables are  number  of  bidders  (N),  the square  of 
number of bidders and control variables. These regressions use the data set without outliers (N>38). Outliers of 
N identified using Grubbs’ test for outliers. Number of bidders equal to and larger than 38 are identified as 
outliers. 
The control variables are : OPENFOREIGN, INST, AUCTYPE and AUCMETHOD. The control variables are 
explained in table V. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 



























AUCTYPE      All coefficients 
are not 
significant. 
AUCMETHOD       5 out of 25 are 
significant.  















* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
Robust standar errors are estimated with similar results. 




log( ) i i
i
Y N Control β β β +
=
= + +∑  
The table displays the regression results of the equation where the dependent variable (Y) is log(Lowest Bid – 
log(Estimated Cost) and independent variables are natural logarithm of the number of bidders (N) and control 
variables. These regressions use the data set without outliers (N>38). Outliers of N identified using Grubbs’ test 
for outliers. Number of bidders equal to and larger than 38 are identified as outliers. 
The control variables are : OPENFOREIGN, INST, AUCTYPE and AUCMETHOD. The control variables are 
explained in table V. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 










INST      8 out of 27 
coefficients are 
significant at 1%. 
Most of the 
coefficients are 
negative. 





AUCTYPE      All  coefficients 
are not 
significant. 
AUCMETHOD      5 out of 25 are 
significant.  











129388  93426 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
















 Table VIII 





( ) j i i
j i
Y Ndummy j Control β β β +
= =
= + + ∑ ∑  
The  table  displays  the  regression  results  of  the  nonlinear  equation  where  the  dependent  variable  (Y)  is 
log(Lowest Bid – log(Estimated Cost) and independent variables are dummies for number of bidders (N), the 
square of number of bidders and control variables. This regression specification is suggested by Rezende (2007). 
These regressions  use  the  data  set  without  outliers  (N>38).  Outliers  of  N  identified  using  Grubbs’  test  for 
outliers. Number of bidders equal to and larger than 38 are identified as outliers. 
The control variables are : OPENFOREIGN, INST, AUCTYPE and AUCMETHOD. The control variables are 
explained in table V. 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
N        -0.070 
        (10.97)** 
N==     3.0000  -0.101  -0.100  -0.083  -0.013 
  (8.09)**  (7.96)**  (6.44)**  (0.91) 
N==     4.0000  -0.304  -0.293  -0.220  -0.080 
  (20.17)**  (19.46)**  (14.07)**  (3.99)** 
N==     5.0000  -0.505  -0.487  -0.367  -0.157 
  (29.05)**  (28.03)**  (19.96)**  (5.98)** 
N==     6.0000  -0.747  -0.725  -0.505  -0.225 
  (38.81)**  (37.63)**  (24.37)**  (6.90)** 
N==     7.0000  -1.002  -0.958  -0.734  -0.383 
  (46.80)**  (44.66)**  (31.43)**  (9.78)** 
N==     8.0000  -1.076  -1.044  -0.754  -0.334 
  (45.86)**  (44.46)**  (28.98)**  (7.27)** 
N==     9.0000  -1.178  -1.129  -0.789  -0.299 
  (47.44)**  (45.29)**  (27.80)**  (5.69)** 
N==    10.0000  -1.330  -1.278  -0.963  -0.403 
  (52.42)**  (50.30)**  (33.18)**  (6.91)** 
N==    11.0000  -1.304  -1.249  -0.757  -0.127 
  (47.20)**  (45.12)**  (23.04)**  (1.93) 
N==    12.0000  -1.535  -1.483  -1.155  -0.455 
  (50.88)**  (49.16)**  (33.40)**  (6.30)** 
N==    13.0000  -2.070  -1.993  -1.634  -0.864 
  (61.95)**  (59.48)**  (40.78)**  (10.74)** 
N==    14.0000  -1.703  -1.645  -0.983  -0.143 
  (50.53)**  (48.60)**  (22.52)**  (1.63) 
N==    15.0000  -1.734  -1.676  -0.930  -0.019 
  (45.22)**  (43.71)**  (18.66)**  (0.20) 
N==    16.0000  -2.234  -2.175  -1.739  -0.758 
  (61.69)**  (59.41)**  (38.77)**  (7.62)** 
N==    17.0000  -1.996  -1.929  -1.312  -0.261 
  (47.18)**  (45.59)**  (24.40)**  (2.39)* 
N==    18.0000  -2.422  -2.335  -1.664  -0.543 
  (56.16)**  (54.06)**  (28.37)**  (4.63)** 
N==    19.0000  -2.074  -2.016  -1.864  -0.673 
  (46.91)**  (45.62)**  (30.63)**  (5.43)** 
N==    20.0000  -2.184  -2.084  -1.497  -0.236 
  (49.82)**  (47.43)**  (25.72)**  (1.84) 
N==    21.0000  -3.402  -3.339  -3.262  -1.931 
  (56.32)**  (55.35)**  (40.74)**  (13.32)** 
N==    22.0000  -2.522  -2.426  -1.470  -0.070 
  (56.56)**  (54.30)**  (26.63)**  (0.50) 
N==    23.0000  -2.746  -2.691  -1.995  -0.524 
  (46.76)**  (45.88)**  (29.41)**  (3.50)** N==    24.0000  -2.225  -2.145  -2.072  -0.531 
  (32.75)**  (31.61)**  (25.04)**  (3.27)** 
N==    25.0000  -2.062  -2.005  -0.999  0.612 
  (30.91)**  (30.10)**  (13.25)**  (3.72)** 
N==    26.0000  -1.899  -1.764  -2.357  -0.676 
  (33.98)**  (31.47)**  (31.53)**  (3.98)** 
N==    27.0000  -2.163  -2.117  -1.465  0.287 
  (26.91)**  (25.78)**  (13.37)**  (1.48) 
N==    28.0000  -2.316  -2.216  -1.547  0.274 
  (31.30)**  (29.95)**  (20.33)**  (1.50) 
N==    29.0000  -2.434  -2.365  -1.888  0.003 
  (31.03)**  (30.19)**  (23.51)**  (0.02) 
N==    30.0000  -2.063  -1.899  0.169  2.130 
  (17.48)**  (16.09)**  (1.03)  (8.81)** 
N==    31.0000  -0.706  -0.645  -0.296  1.735 
  (6.62)**  (6.06)**  (2.90)**  (8.23)** 
N==    32.0000  -1.854  -1.809  -1.259  0.842 
  (17.74)**  (17.35)**  (12.67)**  (3.91)** 
N==    33.0000  -1.146  -1.040  -0.127  2.044 
  (10.53)**  (9.57)**  (0.99)  (8.69)** 
N==    34.0000  -2.205  -2.017  -1.652  0.590 
  (11.53)**  (10.56)**  (9.46)**  (2.20)* 
N==    35.0000  -1.386  -1.215  -0.803  1.508 
  (10.90)**  (9.55)**  (6.92)**  (6.28)** 
N==    36.0000  -2.339  -2.275  -2.303  0.079 
  (18.85)**  (18.37)**  (20.02)**  (0.32) 
N==    37.0000  -0.861  -0.745  -0.402  2.050 
  (6.52)**  (5.65)**  (3.06)**  (7.92)** 
N==    38.0000  -1.050  -0.899  -2.522  0.000 
  (7.04)**  (6.04)**  (10.97)**  (.) 
OPENFOREIGN    -0.233  -0.004  -0.004 
    (23.75)**  (0.36)  (0.36) 
INST      9 out of 27 
coefficients are 
significant at 1%. 
Most of the 
coefficients are 
negative. 
9 out of 27 
coefficients 
are significant 




SECTOR      29 out of 77 are 
significant. Most 
of the coefficients 
are positive. 
29 out of 77 
are significant. 
Most of the 
coefficients 
are positive. 







AUCMETHOD      5 out of 25 are 
significant. 
5 out of 25 are 
significant. 
Constant  -0.341  -0.304  -0.111  0.029 
  (41.74)**  (36.58)**  (0.46)  (0.12) 
Observations  129805  129388  93426  93426 
R-squared  0.21  0.21  0.30  0.30 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.Robust standar errors are estimated with similar results. 
 
 
 Table IX 
Effect of OpenForeign on Y  
 
 
  1  2 




INST     11 out of 27 
coefficients are 
significant at 1%. 
Most of the 
coefficients are 
negative. 
SECTOR     37 out of 77 are 
significant. Most of 
the coefficients are 
positive. 
AUCTYPE    All  coefficients are 
not significant. 
AUCMETHOD    5 out of 25 are 
significant. 




Observations  129388  93426 
R-squared  0.03  0.22 
 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
Robust standar errors are estimated with similar results. 
 Table X 
Effect of OpenForeign on N (Number of Bidders)  
 
 
  1  2 




INST     17 out of 27 
coefficients are 
significant at 1%.  
SECTOR     45 out of 77 are 
significant. Most of 
the coefficients are 
positive. 
AUCTYPE    All  coefficients are 
not significant. 
AUCMETHOD    5 out of 25 are 
significant. 




Observations  129677  93672 
R-squared  0.07  0.24 
 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 






















Figure I: Distribution of number of bidders across auctions. (N= 0 and N=1 are dropped from the dataset. 343 
observations 0.14 percent is N=0. 89908 observations 40.35 percent is N=1. Outliers (N>= 39) are also 
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Figure 2: Estimated N Coefficients with Robust standard errors. The coefficients are from table VIII. The dotted 




Institutions that conduct the procurement auction 
 
Government Institution  Freq.  Percent 
IL OZEL IDARELERI  1,858  1.43 
ADALET BAKANLIGI  1027  0.79 
BASBAKANLIK  1613  1.24 
BAYINDIRLIK VE ISKAN BAKANLIGI  3837  2.95 
BELEDIYELER  12,124  9.32 
DANISTAY  5  0 
DISISLERI BAKANLIGI  15  0.01 
D￿ ZENLEYICI VE DENETLEYICI 
KURUMLAR  72  0.06 
ENERJI VE TABII KAYNAKLAR BAKANLIGI  2314  1.78 
IL OZEL IDARELERI  434  0.33 
ICISLERI BAKANLIGI  4859  3.74 
KITLER  14,082  10.83 
KULTUR VE TURIZM BAKANLIGI  156  0.12 
MAHALLI IDARE BIRLIKLERI  91  0.07 
MALIYE BAKANLIGI  337  0.26 
MILLI EGITIM BAKANLIGI  13,933  10.71 
MILLI SAVUNMA BAKANLIGI  11,666  8.96 
SAGLIK BAKANLIGI  38,671  29.73 
SANAYI VE TICARET BAKANLIGI  82  0.06 
SAYISTAY  4  0 
TARIM VE KOYISLERI BAKANLIGI  1515  1.16 
TURKIYE BUYUK MILLET MECLISI  57  0.05 
ULASTIRMA BAKANLIGI  119  0.09 
YARGITAY  6  0 
YUKSEK EGITIM KURUMLARI  10,836  8.33 
CALISMA VE SOSYAL GUVENLIK 
BAKANLIGI  7,053  5.42 
CEVRE VE ORMAN BAKANLIGI  1319  1.01 
OZEL BUTCELI KURUMLAR  2006  1.55 
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Figure A.2: Sectoral differentiation of number of bidders. The x-axis is the sector identification number and y-
axis is number of valid bidders in the auction. Sector data is available for only 94,101 auctions.  Table A.2 
Sectoral Description of Outliers (N>38) 
 
Sector  Freq.  Percent 
100  206  13.46 
1000000  70  4.58 
1.30E+07  29  1.9 
1.50E+07  1  0.07 
1.70E+07  1  0.07 
2.90E+07  55  3.59 
3.20E+07  49  3.2 
3.30E+07  961  62.81 
4.52E+07  1  0.07 
4.52E+07  3  0.2 
4.52E+07  4  0.26 
6.00E+07  2  0.13 
7.10E+07  25  1.63 
8.00E+07  111  7.25 
8.50E+07  12  0.78 
Total  1,530        100.00 
      
 
Table A.3 
Instutional Description of Outliers (N>38) 
 
        
Government Institution  Freq.  Percent 
                         BASBAKANLIK          1  0.04 
BAYINDIRLIK VE ISKAN BAKANLIGI            2  0.08 
BELEDIYELER  119  4.79 
ENERJI VE TABII KAYNAKLAR BAKANLIGI          58  2.33 
KITLER  492  19.8 
MILLI EGITIM BAKANLIGI         252  11.5 
SAGLIK BAKANLIGI         1021  41.09 
TARIM VE KOY IŞLERI BAKANLIGI           11  0.44 
YÜKSEK ÖGRETIM KURUMLARI        405  16.3 
ÇALISMA VE SOSYAL GÜVENLIK BAKANLIGI        124  4.99 
Total   2485       100.00 
 